Abstract: Using a survey of agricultural households in Burkina Faso, we provide evidence that plots owned by the head of the household are farmed much more intensively than plots, with similar characteristics and planted to the same crops, owned by other household members (of both genders). As in previous studies, this evidence is inconsistent with the assumption of Pareto e¢ ciency in household decisions, but additionally suggests that status within the household rather than gender per se may be the most important factor in determining the allocation of productive resources within the household. We argue that the higher yields achieved by the household head may be explained in terms of social norms that require him to spend the earnings from some farms under his control exclusively on household public goods, as has been observed in the anthropological literature on this region. Using expenditures data, and measures of rainfall to capture weatherrelated shocks to agricultural income, that the household head has a higher marginal propensity to spend on household public goods than other household members.
Introduction
Empirical studies of intra-household allocation has revealed that, in many instances, gender is an important determinant in the allocation of resources within the household. For developing countries, in particular, the literature has produced evidence of systematic di¤erences between genders in the allocation of resources relating to nutrition, health and education (see, e.g. Du ‡o, 2005, for a recent survey of this literature).
Furthermore, the literature has provided extensive evidence that the initial distribution of resources between men and women often a¤ect household outcomes, thus leading to the discrediting of the 'Unitary Model'of the household. Evidence on imperfect risk-sharing within the household (Udry 1996) has also led to the discrediting of the 'Collective Model'of the household (Browning and Chiappori, 1998) which posits that, regardless of the distribution of resources within the household, the allocation is e¢ cient.
In light of this evidence, the theoretical literature has recently turned its attention to possible constraints that can prevent an e¢ cient outcome within the household and, in particular, to models of dynamic bargaining exhibiting lack of commitment (Ligon 2002 , Basu 2006 , Lundberg and Pollak 2003 . such as lack of commitment and informational asymmetries.
Yet, wthin the theoretical literature on intra-household allocation, why gender matters within the household remains an open question. The afore-mentioned models treat the household as a collection of agents, with possibly con ‡icting preferences, but makes no distinction between the genders.
In this paper we propose a simple model of intra-household allocation based on a particular social institution for the organisation of agricultural production practised among certain ethnic groups in West Africa. We highlight how this institution, while resolving certain problems of commitment and informational asymmetry, can also lead to a gendered pattern in the allocation of productive resources and consumption within the household, consistent with the exisiting empirical literature. Using the survey of agricultural households in Burkina Faso, drawn from 8 village around the country, we also provide evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions.
In the context of agricultural production by a household unit, the ethnographic literature makes a distinction between 'common'farm plots, managed by the household head, to which all household members tend to contribute some labour, and 'private'plots which are worked individually or by smaller groups within the household. The head of the household carries a particular obligation to provide for the entire household using the proceeds from the 'common'plot.
Consistent with this hypothesis, we show, using rainfall variations to capture exogenous weather shocks to agricultural output, that the head of the household has a higher propensity to spend on household public goods out of his farm income than do the other household members. This suggests that members of the household should be more willing to work on the plots farmed by the household head than on private plots, because the former is able, thanks to a particular social institution, to commit to using the fruits of their toil on household public goods. Consistent with this reasoning, we show that 'common'plots managed by the household head use family labour more intensively,and achieve higher yields, than private plots (after controlling for plot characteristics and the crops planted).
As in the previous literature, we also …nd that farm plots managed by male household members use family labour more intensively, and achieve higher yields, than those managed by female household members in the same household. However, no such gender di¤erence exists among the private plots: male and female private plots have similar yields, and each is farmed primarily with family labour of the same gender as the plot manager. Thus, the social institution which places a particular obligation on the head of the household, and the fact that the household head is usually a man, can account entirely for the gendered pattern in agricultural production documented in the existing literature.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the ethnographic literature on the organisation of agricultural production and the consumption among a number of ethnic groups in West Africa, based, in particular, around the Sahel region. Section 3 develops a simple model of intra-household allocation which draws on this ethnographic evidence. A brief description of the household survey used for the econometric analysis is given in Section 4. Section 5 discusses our empirical …ndings and Section 6 concludes.
The Function of the ' Common'Plot in Burkinabe Households
In this section, we highlight two features of production and consumption within Burkinabe households by drawing on ethnographic studies. The …rst of these features is that the household typically carries out its farming activities on a number of distinct plots with well-de…ned boundaries, each under the control of a speci…c adult household member. Among these plots, there is a separation between 'common' plots under the control of the head of the household, and 'private' plots controlled by other household members. The second feature is that according to existing social norms, the head of the household is expected to provide for the entire household using the proceeds of the 'common' plot, but the other household members have more leeway in how they use the income from their own plots.
These two features will play an important part in the formal model introduced in the following section. Therefore, we discuss them in some detail here in the context of the ethnographic literature. The studies cited below are all based on the Mossi, an ethnic group that practises farming and constitutes about 40 percent of the population of Burkina Faso. 1 The Mossi are also the predominant ethnic group in two of the eight villages used for the CEDRES/Laval household survey, which is used for the empirical analysis in this paper.
The characterisation of agricultural production within Mossi households by ethnographers consistently distinguish between 'common'plots, which are farmed communally and managed by the head of the household, and 'private'plots managed by other members of the household. Hammond to feed his wives and dependent children, to pay his tax, to be used as part of the bridewealth payment made by his sons when they marry, to o¤er hospitality to visitors, and to provide for the preparation of the millet gruel and millet bear used in sacri…cial libations. But the millet in the granaries of the family head serves also as an emergency store to be used by any member of the family in need.' (p. 76) Lallemand (1977; p. 100) provides a similar description of the use of the harvest from the common plot. It is likely that the head of the household is motivated, at least in part, by altruism in his decisions regarding the use of the proceeds from the 'common'plot. However, we argue that a binding social rule is necessary to account for the pattern of usage described in the ethnographic literature, which is also borne out in our empirical analysis: since the extent of head's altruism, and the nature of this altruism, is likely to vary across households, altruism alone would lead to considerable heterogeneity across households in the usage of the proceeds from the 'comon' plot.
A more regular pattern is more consistent with a social rule that is generally observed across households.
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Strategy
Imagine a household consisting of n adult members indexed by i = 1; 2; ::; n. 3 Each household member owns a plot of land with a vector of characteristics A i , which includes land area, soil quality, etc. There are m k di¤erent crops which may be grown on a farm, indexed k = 1; 2; ::; m k . These crops may overlap with the private and public consumption goods. Each household member has access to the same production technology described by
Here, y k is the output level of crop k on person i's farm plot, assuming that crop k has been planted on this farm (for simplicity, we assume that a single crop can be planted on a farm at any one time).
L m and L f are, respectively, the levels of male and female labour used on person i's farm plot.
Household member i has a labour endowment of L i hours. Each person has the same labour productivity except that male and female labour may vary in their relative productivity in di¤erent tasks. This last assumption is implicit in the description of agricultural production in (1). We assume that there is no labour market present, such that all farm work must be done using family labour (Although this is a simpli…cation, the data will show that there is only very limited use of hired labour in agriculture for our sample of households). 3 Hereafter, whenever we refer to a 'household member', this will mean an adult member.
The Collective Model of the Household
First, we provide a characterisation of the e¢ cient allocation of resources within the household.
The following maximisation problem solves for such an allocation:
subject to
where p x ; p z and p k represent, respectively, a vector of prices of the private and household public goods, and the market price of crop k; I s is the set of all household members belonging to gender s: I s = fi 2 I : i belongs to gender sg, k i is the choice of crop on the farm plot of household member i.
i is the pareto weight assigned to individual i in the household welfare maximisation problem.
It is well-known that this problem satis…es the standard separation property of the agricultural household model (see, e.g. Bardhan and Udry, Chapter 1). In particular, Udry (1996) shows that if F k (:) is increasing and concave in both types of labour, then the output levels are equal on plots which have the same characteristics and are planted with the same crop: i.e.
Then, adjusting the notation to allow for multiple households and time periods, the following speci…cation enables us to test for e¢ ciency in household production:
where Q htci is the log of yield on plot i in year t, planted to crop c and belonging to household h; X hci is a vecor of physical characteristics of plot i; htc is a household-year-crop …xed e¤ect; and G hi is a vector of individual characteristics of individual i in household h. Udry (1996) shows that if productive resources are allocated e¢ ciently within the household, then = 0; i.e. yield on a plot
should not depend on the characteristics of the individual who controls it. Our data will enable us to replicate Udry's test of productive e¢ ciency within the household for our household sample.
Furthermore, e¢ cient production implies that if
if two farm plots with the same characteristics are planted to the same crop, then they should make use of the same amount of male labour and the same amount of female labour.
Therefore, corresponding to (6), we can derive a speci…cation for the level of each type of labour used on a particular plot:
where l j htci is the amount of labour of type j applied to plot i per unit area, in year t, and plot i is planted to crop c and belongs to house h.^ j htc is a household-year-crop …xed e¤ect. Productive e¢ ciency within the household implies that^ j = 0 for j = m; f .
A Model of Voluntary Contributions under a Social Norm
Next, we consider a non-cooperative equilibrium for the model. We assume that each household member is able to allocate the proceeds of his farm plot and his labour endowment freely and that, because of lack of commitment, the members of the household cannot have a cooperative agreement that would enable them to implement the pareto e¢ cient outcome in household production. However, traditional institutions require that the proceeds of a 'common plot' managed by the head of the household be spent entirely on certain household public goods; failing which the household head will be subject to social sanctions by the wider community.
For ease of exposition, we assume there are just three household members: the head of the household (represented by the letters h) who has a zero endowment of labour and manages only the common plot, and one adult male and another adult female member (represented by the letters m and f ) who have labour endowments E m and E f respectively and manage their own private plots. There is a single crop with market price of 1, a single private good x, with market price p x , and one household public good z with market price p z . We assume that there is no scope for saving.The social norm requires the household head to spend the proceeds from the common plot on the public good z.
Labour allocation and consumption decisions are made in two stages. In the …rst stage, household members m and f decide how to allocate their labour endowments across the three plots.
Following these decisions, farm incomes are realised. Income from person i's plot is given by We assume that the household decisions constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium. Therefore, the equilibrium choices can be determined using backward induction. Given income y = y m ; y f ; y c (representing incomes from the male, female and common plots, respectively), the expenditure levels denoted by x i ; z i , i = m; f solve the following problems:
The interesting case occurs when both m and f make zero contribution to the public good z. In this case, we obtain x m (y) = y m =p x ; x f (y) = y f =p x and total expenditures on the public good,
Given the functions x m (y) ; x f (y) and z (y), we can derive the equilibrium labour allocation decisions made by the household members. Let
represent the allocation of labour by household member i across the male, female and common plots. Then, the equilibrium
where y = y m ; y f ; y c ,
Since all the proceeds from the private plots are used for private consumption, we obtain
i.e. the household members do not contribute any labour to each other's private plots because doing so does not yield any bene…ts for themselves. Therefore, both m and f allocates all of his/her labour endowment betwen the common plot and his/her own private plot. The precise allocation of labour across the two types of plots are given by the …rst-order conditions to (10) and (11):
where u i x and u i z denote the partial derivative of person i's utility function, u i (x; z) with respect to
x and z respectively.
Thus all household members are persuaded to provide some labour on the farm managed by the head of the household; given the social norm that proceeds from the common plot are to be used for household public goods only, they can expect to reap some rewards from the toiling on the common plot. On the other hand, they do not contribute any labour on each other's private farms;
because the managers of the private plot cannot commit to spend their income on anything other than their own private goods. Thus, we obtain the result that the common plot is farmed with a mix of male and female labour while the private plots are farmed almost entirely with labour of the same type as the gender of the plot manager.
Predictions
These predictions can be tested by estimating (7) . Let H hi be a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if individual i in household h is the household head and zero otherwise; and let M hi be a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if individual i in household h is an adult male but not the household head, and zero otherwise. If G hi = (H hi ; M hi ), and correspondingly,
then, under the noncooperative equilibrium analysed above, we have^
In words, these conditions imply that (i) male plots use male labour more intensively than female plots with similar characteristics and planted to the same crops; (ii) female plots use female labour more intensively than male plots with similar characteristics and planted to the same crops; (iii) the common plot uses male labour more intensively than female plots, and female labour more intensively than male plots, after controlling for the type of crop, and the plot characteristics.
Note that the model also predicts that^ Furthermore, the model predicts that yields across di¤erent plots belonging to the same household can depend on the characteristics of the plot owner (after controlling for plot characteristics, and the type of crop planted). In particular, if the junior household members value the household public good su¢ ciently, then the common plot will be farmed more intensively than either the male or female plots. Therefore we would expect yields to be higher on the common plots compared to the individual plots. In (??), if G hi = (H hi ; M hi ), and correspondingly, = ( H ; M ), then we have the prediction that H > 0 and H > M . There is no clear prediction about the sign of M .
If both m and f make voluntary contributions to the household public good, then equilibrium expenditures on consumption goods will be determined by total household income only, and will be independent of the income shares of the di¤erent household members (see Lundberg and Pollak, 1993) . In this situation, household members will allocate their labour across di¤erent plots so as to maximise total household income. Therefore, labour allocation within the household will be e¢ cient and the empirical predictions will correspond to those for the e¢ cient model.
Consumption
The collective model of the household, and the model of voluntary labour contributions introduced in section 3.2 above also provide testable predictions involving household consumption.
First, in the case of the collective model, temporary shocks to household income should have no impact on expenditures on any particular good after total household expenditures has been controlled for. Otherwise, it would be possible to achieve better consumption smoothing by reallocating expenditures on that good across time periods. Du ‡o and Udry (2004) uses this insight to devise a test for e¢ ciency in household consumption using rainfall data to capture weather-related shocks. We replicate their test in this paper using data on household public goods, and income from the common and private plots. We brie ‡y discuss here Du ‡o and Udry's test of e¢ ciency in consumption.
The test involves, …rst, estimating a linear regression of the di¤erence over two years in the logarithm of household income from a particular source on the change in rainfall realisation over this period. Speci…cally, the equation to be estimated may be represented as follows:
where y hit represents income in period t from plot i belonging to household h, R ht is the rainfall realisation speci…c to household h in period t (i.e. using available data from the rainfall station closest to household h), P hi is a vector describing the time-…xed characteristics of plot i such as soil type and topography, X ht denotes other time-variant household characteristics pertaining to period t, and hi is the error term that captures other exogenous shocks that a¤ect income from plot i.
The estimated coe¢ cients results are then used to compute a linear combination of the rainfall variables as follows:
These …tted values, which represent the component in the change in plot income that is explained by rainfall variations, are used in linear regressions involving household expenditures in di¤erent categories:
where e ht represents total expenditures in household h in period t, and x ht represents expenditures on some speci…c consumption good in household h in period t. The household survey did not distinguish between household head's 'private'plots and 'common' plots that he managed on behalf of the household.Therefore, for the purpose of the analysis in this paper, we consider all plots farmed by the household head as 'common'plots.
5 Household Headship and ' Junior'Men within the Household Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics from the household survey, from which we can immediately glean a number of important facts. First, in the majority of cases, the head of the household is a man. This fact alone, we will argue, can account for most of the gendered pattern in household production and consumption in the data. Second, a signi…cant fraction of adult males in the sample do not head the household to which they belong. However, these men, whom we shall refer to as 'junior men'in the following discussion, do farm private plots of their own. Table 1 shows that the 'common'plots, as de…ned here, are, on average, about four times larger than the private plots farmed by the junior men, and six times larger than the private plots farmed by the women (excluding those who head their own households, and are therefore included in the 'household head'category). The 'common'plots, on average, generate about eight times as much income as the junior male plots and about six times as much income as the female plots. Table 1 also indicates the use of very di¤erent types of labour on the farm plots depending on the identity of the plot owner. The female plots are farmed primarily with female family labour, which very likely includes hours that the plot owner has, herself, spent working on the farm. The junior male plots use both male and female family labour, but the contribution of male labour is more signi…cant (about seventy-…ve percent higher) than that of female family labour. The 'common' plots use substantial amounts of both male and female family labour. All three types of plots use some amount of child family labour.
The descriptive statistics shows that the nature of production on 'common'plots are, on average, very di¤erent from that on private plots, at least in terms of the scale of farming and the types of labour used. This di¤erentiated pattern does not, in itself, imply that the allocation of labour across the household plots is ine¢ cient. The pattern may be explained by the di¤erent labour requirements of crops grown by di¤erent household members, by di¤erences in soil type, etc. Therefore, we estimate equations (??) and (7), which will enable us to see if these patterns persist after these factors have been controlled for. Table 1 also shows that the household head is primarily responsible for expenditures that may be classi…ed as household public goods. On average, the household head spends four times as much on household public goods as a junior man and three times as much as a woman.
Results

Plot Yields
Column 1 in Table 2 shows the estimated coe¢ cients for equation (??) with dummy variables for household headship and junior male status within the household. The estimated equation also included controls for variations in rainfall, interacted with plot characteristics. The estimated coe¢ cient for the household head dummy is large and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Therefore, we are able to reject the hypothesis of Pareto e¢ ciency in household production. The coe¢ cient for the junior male dummy variable (which takes a value of 1 if the plot owner is an adult male who does not head the household and zero otherwise) is small and not statistically di¤erent from zero.
Therefore, for plots owned by same household, that have similar characteristics and are planted to the same crops in the same year, there are no signi…cant di¤erences in yields between those controlled by women and those controlled by junior men.
On the other hand, the estimated coe¢ cients are consistent with the model of voluntary contributions. Recall, from section 3.2.1 that the model predicts that yields on common plots will be higher than those on private plots. The estimated coe¢ cient for the household head dummy is greater than zero and greater than the coe¢ cient for the junior men, and the di¤erence is statistically signi…cant in both cases.
Note that these results are consistent with …ndings in the existing literature which has shown, in similar contexts, that plot yields are higher for men than for women, when comparing across farms owned by the same household, planted to the same crops and with similar charactertistics (see, for example, Udry, 1996 and Goldstein and Udry, 2008) . However, our …ndings show that, for our sample of households, the higher yields achieved by men can be attributed entirely to household headship, since there is no statistically signi…cant di¤erence in plot yields between female plots and those farmed by men who do not head the household in which they live.
Next, we trace the di¤erence in plot yields to variations in labour use across plots. controlled by the household head use all types of family labour -adult male, adult female, and child labour -more intensively than other plots owned by the same household, after controlling for plot characteristics, the crop planted and the year of planting (with the di¤erence being statistically signi…cant in each case). This pattern is inconsistent with the predictions of the Pareto e¢ cient (collective) model. As discussed in section 3.1, the model predicts that the allocation of labour across plots can depend on the plot characteristics and the crop planted, but should be independent of the characteristics of the plot owner.
Labour Allocation
While plots farmed by 'junior'men use male family labor more intensively than those farmed by women, the opposite is true for 'female'family labor, by about the same order of magnitude. There are no signi…cant di¤erences in the use of child labor between the 'junior' men and the women.
The pattern of labor allocation across agricultural plots appear consistent with the variation in plot yields discussed earlier, with the common plots achieving the highest yields and also making use of family labour and outside labour most intensively.
This pattern is also, at least in part, consistent with the predictions of the model of voluntary labour contribtions discussed in section 3.2.1. Recall that one of the model's predictions is that the common plot uses male family labour more intensively than private plots farmed by women, and female family labour more intensively than private plots farmed by junior men. If we interpret the plots farmed by the household head as 'common'plots, then the estimated coe¢ cients correspond to these predictions.
However, the model of voluntary labour contributions also generated the prediction that household members do not provide any labour on each others'private plots, and the descriptive statistics in table 1 shows that they clearly do (since family labour of the opposite gender is used on private plots). We speculate that such labour contributions, which are much smaller than contributions to the common plots, may be due to 'side transactions'between the junior male members and the women within the same household; a dynamic ‡ow of goods and services in which labour is just one element. Hammond (1966) describe some exchanges along these lines: a junior male, with a bicycle, may help out a female household member to carry some of her produce to a distant market and, in exchange, she may spend some time working on his plot during the farming season. Our theoretical model did not allow for such exchanges.
The pattern of labor allocation indicates that the household head is able to induce family members to provide labour on common plots much more e¤ectively than the junior men and the women. It also shows that while these junior household members have the assistance of some family labour of the opposite gender on their private plots, they are relying primarily on labour of their own gender. This labour of their own gender is potentially their own labour, although there is no way of verifying this on the basis of the available data.
Why is the head of the household so much more successful at comanding family labour? The model presented in section 3.2 posits that it is because the household head is committed to spend the proceeds from the common plot on household public goods. We analysis consumption data next to see if this hypothesis has any support in the data.
Expeditures on Household Public Goods and Rainfall Shocks
Using data on annual rainfall for each province in Burkina Faso, we estimate equation (14) for three di¤erent sources of household income: female, junior male and household head farm income.
The coe¢ cients from the …rst-stage regressions are shown in Table 4 . The F-tests indicate that the the coe¢ cients for the rainfall variables, and the plot characterstics-and-rainfall interactions are jointly signi…cant in all three regressions. Next, using the …tted-values for the di¤erent types of farm income and total expenditures on household public goods, we estimate equation (16). The coe¢ cients from the second-stage regression provide a measure of the responsiveness of household expenditures to changes in household income due to exogenous rainfall shocks.
The coe¢ cients indicate that a 10% increase in the household head's income due to variations in rainfall leads to a 3.23% increase in expenditures on household public goods. This e¤ect is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. By contrast, the corresponding values for income from junior male, and female, private plots lead are 1.07% and 1.54% respectively (signi…cant at the 5% level). Using chi-square tests, we can reject the null-hypothesis of equality between the household head and the junior male coe¢ cients at the 1% level, and of equality between the household head and female coe¢ cients at the 13% level. The null-hypothesis of equality between the coe¢ cients for the junior male and female household members cannot be rejected.
Therefore, the household head has a higher marginal propensity to spend on household public goods out of income from farms managed by him or her, than do the junior household members.
In this case, the household members would have a stronger incentive to provide labour on the …elds managed by the household head than on the private plots of the other household members, and can explain the pattern of allocation family labour across household plots described in the preceding section.
The results are also consistent with the reasoning underlying the model of voluntary contributions under a social norm presented in section 3.2. However the estimated coe¢ cients do not match exactly with the predictions of the model, and therefore we discuss brie ‡y why. First, the model predicts that, for household public goods, the coe¢ cient xc in (16) should equal 1. However, if we allow for intertemporal savings within the model, then an argument akin the Permanent Income Hypothesis should imply that a temporary income shock, as rainfall variations would produce, should not lead to a one-for-one change in expenditures, even if the household head is socially obliged to spend the proceeds from his (common) farm plots on household public goods. This would explain why^ xc < 1 in the second-stage regression. Second, the model predicts that xm = xf = 0 (with x denoting expenditures on household public goods). However, if there are multiple household public goods, and the corner solution in consumption expenditures assumed in section 3.2 applies to only a subset of them, this would explain why we obtain xm > 0 and xf > 0.
Conclusion
Empirical studies of households in developing countries have repeatedly found that the allocation of resources within the household is correlated with gender. By contrast, theories of intra-household allocation, for the most part, have remained gender-blind. The household is treated as a collection of agents with distinct preferences, but with no a priori di¤erence between a man and a woman.
In this paper we suggest that some of the gender-related patterns observed in the empirical investigation of households may be explained by the fact that the head of the household, who is bestowed with authority over as well as responsibilities towards the other members of the household by existing social norms, is in most instances male. We suggest that gender-related patterns in the allocation of resources within the household can be explained without resorting to any assumption of innate di¤erences in preferences or power between men and women; but rather by di¤erences in their positions created by social norms. The key piece of evidence we provide for this argument is that, for agricultural households in Burkina Faso, yields on plots owned by men who are not household heads are similar to those achieved on plots owned by women in the same household (controlling for plot characteristics and the crops planted), while yields achieved by household heads (who are, in most instances male) are signi…cantly higher.
The variations in plot yields can be accounted for by the pattern of labour allocation within the household: both male and female household members provide signi…cant amounts of labour to the farm plots managed by the household head, but substantially less labour on plots managed by junior household members of the opposite gender. This pattern of labour allocation does not appear to be Pareto e¢ cient. However, the pattern is consistent with a scenario where family labour is o¤ered voluntarily, and to the farm plots where one calculates the greatest bene…t for oneself.
If the household head is obliged, by social norms, to provide for household public goods using the proceeds from his farm plots, then the junior household members would have much stronger incentives to work for the household head, than on some other household plot, over which he or she has no claim. This explanation …nds substantial support in the ethnographic literature which describes a distinction between 'common'and 'private'plots belonging to the same household, and the di¤erent rules which apply in each case. Lastly, in support of this explanation, we show that the head of the household has, indeed, a higher propensity to spend on household public goods out of his agricultural income than do the other household members.
